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INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages have always had an unusual place in tort law.'
Occupying the uncertain space between civil actions and criminal
sanctions, their justification and purpose are the subjects of an
ongoing theoretical debate.2 In an era in which punitive damage
awards have skyrocketed, theoretical debates about punitive damages
have become of great interest to legislatures and judges, from the trial
1. See Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 79, 79 (1982) ("[Ilitigating a tort dispute involving punitive damages, much like
navigating the Straits of Magellan, runs the risk of incurring grave losses from colliding
with unforeseen objects. There is no clear standard for deciding when punitive damages
are appropriate or for computing their magnitude when awarded.").
2. See infra notes 22-42, 61-62 and accompanying text.
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level3 to the United States Supreme Court.' Given the somewhat
arbitrary outer bounds of punitive damages, crafting an appropriate
definition for this remedy has become an endeavor in which the
stakes are high and the solutions difficult. Late in the nineteenth
century, Justice Matthews noted that "no precise rule of law fixes the
recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to
determine the amount by their verdict." 5
Enter the medical malpractice "crisis. ,' 6 According to Jury
Verdicts Research, median medical malpractice jury verdicts jumped
from $474,536 in 1996 to $1,000,000 in 2000. 7 These increases have
occurred within a more general rising tide of health care costs, both in
North Carolina and nationally.' As stated by William Pully, President
of the North Carolina Hospital Association,
Healthcare [sic] costs are rising, again. Yours and ours. For
businesses and for hospitals. Okay, that's not freshly minted
news. Healthcare premium increases have sent shock waves
through human resource departments, grayed the hair of
numerous chief financial officers, created grimaces on the
faces of CEOs and prompted some difficult decisions
around board tables.9
Medical malpractice insurance contributes to the upward trend in
health care costs.' 0 The North Carolina Hospital Association has
3. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 123, 123 (1982) (studying the punitive awards of Cook County, Illinois over a
twenty-two year period).
4. Justice O'Connor has written, "[rlecent years ... have witnessed an explosion in
the frequency and size of punitive damages awards." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003) (holding that punitive damage awards generally
comport with due process when they are single digit multiples of compensatory awards);
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996) (articulating the threshold beyond which
punitive damages invoke constitutional due process protections for the defendant).
5. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
6. See Stan Swofford, Malpractice Insurance Might Rise: Costs Could Be Passed
Onto Patients as Doctors and Hospitals Scramble to Find Coverage after a Major Insurer
Leaves the Market, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Dec. 14, 2001, at IA (predicting major
increases for malpractice insurance coverage because of the loss of an insurance carrier,
economic shocks to the economy, and rising jury verdicts).
7. Press Release, Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Medical Malpractice: Verdicts,
Settlements, and Statistical Analysis (March 22, 2002) (summarizing a commercial report
on settlement awards, plaintiff recovery rights, and jury awards in medical malpractice
actions) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
8. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
149 (2002).
9. William Pully, Are Hospitals Sick?, NORTH CAROLINA, Jan. 2003, at 37.
10. Grace Vandecruze, Has the Tide Begun to Turn for Medical Malpractice?, 15
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estimated that medical malpractice premiums have climbed one
hundred twenty-seven percent from 2001 to 2002, and forecasts call
for commensurate premiums increases of nearly one hundred percent
for 2003.11 Many hospitals have turned to self-insurance, given the
12
unprecedented rate increases.
North Carolina's General Assembly attempted to address the
punitive damages and medical malpractice dilemmas in 1995.13 Given
that punitive damages are not available to plaintiffs suing for breach
of contract in North Carolina,14 the punitive damages statute's limits
have principally affected tort actions.
Approaching the issue from a law and economics perspective
enables one to devise a formula for optimal punitive damage levels,
understand the incentive structure under a given legal regime, and
predict the actions of parties in litigating cases with possible punitive
damages.
The predictions of the economic model allow
recommendations about the further refinement of the legal
framework in North Carolina and other states with similar statutes.
There is a pervasive feeling among the public that medical
malpractice and punitive damages are out of control. 5 Indeed, one
might plausibly argue that these two controversial areas are
responsible for a portion of the bias against lawyers: 6 1) actions
against doctors, of whom the public is justifiably supportive, and 2)
actions for large, speculative damage amounts perceived to be greater
than the damage actually caused.'7 Critiquing the law of punitive
damages and medical malpractice from an economic standpoint,
HEALTH LAWYER 15, 15 (2002).
11.

N.C. Hosp. ASS'N, HOSPITAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE

SURVEY

RESULTS (Dec. 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
12. Id. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
13. See Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 514, sec. 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1825, 1825 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-1 (2001)). The bill, "An Act to Establish Standards and
Procedures for the Recovery of Punitive Damages in Civil Actions," was codified into the
General Statutes of North Carolina as sections 1D and 28A-18-2(b). Id.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(d) (2001).
15. See generally NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN

JURY 254, 266-77 (1995) (discussing the various opinions of malpractice verdicts).
16. See Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1437 n.153 (1999) (analyzing the public's mistrust of plaintiff
attorneys, especially in the area of medical malpractice and its prominence in the popular
media due to television advertising). Professor Gross also cites the large jury verdicts and
the profits that lawyers make on them through contingency fees as being further black
eyes on the profession. Id. at 1416, 1445. Medical malpractice contingency fees have also
been limited by statute in at least one state. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-1114 (2003)
(establishing numerical limits on medical malpractice contingency fees).
17. VIDMAR, supra note 15, at 253-54.

2374

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

therefore, is critical to answering the somewhat intuitive nature of
popular concerns about these problems. Further, public views are
presumably reflected in lawmakers' decisions. For that reason, the
popular perception of a legal regime is always important, not just for
the public's confidence in the system, but also for the eventual
trajectory of the political process as it drives statutory change. This
Comment attempts to develop a more comprehensive model of
punitive damages in medical malpractice than currently exists in the
literature. The goal of this model is to demonstrate the strengths and
weaknesses of North Carolina's approach and inductively apply these
findings to punitive damages and medical malpractice law across the
country. This model will employ concepts of both fairness and
efficiency in an attempt to bridge the divide between the two in an
economic framework.
Section I provides an overview of the history of punitive damages
and medical malpractice law in North Carolina, with a special
emphasis on recent tort reform efforts. Section II analyzes some of
the economic costs that arise from medical malpractice. Section III
constructs a theoretical microeconomic model of malpractice in the
nursing home context that potentially justifies punitive liability.
Section IV, given the results of Section III, recommends changes in
the law to optimize social welfare. Section V predicts how plaintiffs
and defendants will act in the legal regime. Lastly, Section VI
recommends practical uses of this Comment's economic analysis and
touches on the future of the law surrounding these issues at both the
state and federal levels.
I. THE STATUTES AND CASE LAW

A.

Punitive Damages in North Carolina

The North Carolina General Assembly enacted broad-based tort
reform in 199518 after considerable pressure from the conservative
caucus in the North Carolina House, which took control of the lower
body in the Republican electoral landslide of 1994."9 As part of the
national Republican Party's "Contract with America," the
Republican Party proposed a national cap on punitive damages in

18. § 1D-1; Joseph Neff, Business Gets Good Feeling on Politics, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), April 30, 1995, at IF.
19. Jay Eubank, General Assembly Beginning New Era Dominated by GOP,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jan. 22, 1995, at Al.
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medical malpractice.2 0 North Carolina's Republican Party, likewise
had "A New Contract for the People, by the People" which, while less
congruent with the
specific, espoused a pro-business platform
'
national party's "Contract with America. 21
The heart of the 1995 tort reform, "the jewel in the business
[lobby's] crown, '22 was the addition of section 1D to the General
Statutes of North Carolina.23 The statute created a punitive damages
cap in which no punitive damage award may exceed the greater of
either $250,000 or three times the compensatory damage award.24
The new statute provided that when punitive damages are at issue,
there is a bifurcated trial in which punitive liability is to be
determined after compensatory liability has been established.25 The
jury is not to be apprised of this cap prior to its deliberations.2 6 If the
jury awards punitive damages exceeding the statutory cap, the judge
is to reduce the punitive damage amount so as to make it comply with
the limitation.2 7
In recent years, North Carolina courts have interpreted the longstanding justification for punitive damages. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he purpose of punitive damages
is to punish wrongdoers for misconduct of an aggravated, extreme,
outrageous, or malicious character. '28 Punitive damages have also
been justified under a pseudo-compensatory rationale: punitive
damages supplement the compensatory award to cover losses that are
not figured into the compensatory damages amount.29
20. Greg Gordon, Baby Steps: No Giant Strides Expected from Republican Efforts to
Reform Health Care System, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 18, 1994, at 27A; Michael
Ross, Politics: GOP's 10-Point Plan,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at A5.
21. See Joe Dew, Republicans Offer Deal for Voters, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 5, 1994, at 3A; Rob Christenson, Finally, GOP Taken Seriously, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19, 1999, at 3A.
22. Mary E. Miller & Joseph Neff, Legislators Followed Voters' Lead, Shook Up the
Status Quo, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 2, 1995, at 1A.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D (2001).
24. Id. § 1D-25(b). This section forms the heart of the punitive damages tort reform
from 1995, and it is the most controversial. Note that this statutory cap does not apply to
punitive damages for injury due to driving while impaired. See id. § 1D-26.
25. Id. § 1D-30.
26. Id. § 1D-25(c).
27. Id. § 1D-25(b).
28. Nance v. Robertson, 91 N.C. App. 121, 123, 370 S.E.2d 283, 284 (1988); see also
Kuykendall v. Turner, 61 N.C. App. 638, 643, 301 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1983) ("The purpose of
punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff for personal injuries. Instead, they are
awarded to punish the defendant's conduct.") (citing Emily Hightower, NORTH
CAROLINA LAW OF DAMAGES § 4-1 (1981)).
29. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 679, 562 S.E.2d 82, 91 (2002) (noting
the clear distinction between the purposes of and constitutional authority for
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In a substantive due process challenge to the punitive damages
cap, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that section 1D of the
General Statutes of North Carolina passed constitutional muster, as
there was a rational basis for the law.3" The conceivable rational basis
was for "[t]he legitimate public purpose of preserving and furthering
the economic development of North Carolina."'" In calculating
punitive damages, the fact-finder may take the defendant's wealth

into consideration.3 2 Further, insurance for punitive damages liability
is allowed.33 Therefore, insurance companies that cover liability for
punitive damages will benefit from the cap. Protecting their general
economic development interests is the legitimate and conceivable
rational basis for the cap.34

The statute stipulates that the cap does not apply to "gross
negligence.' 35 Additionally, the statute requires clear and convincing
evidence to prove punitive liability.36 In particular, the plaintiff must
show fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct to establish the
prima facie case for punitive liability.37
B.

Medical Malpractice

Medical malpractice tort reform occurred in North Carolina in
1995. As such, medical malpractice and punitive damages tort
reforms should be considered in tandem, as they were passed by the
compensatory and punitive damage awards).
30. Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 682-85, 562 S.E.2d at 90-92 (establishing the
requirements for punitive damages under the North Carolina Constitution). See Dept. of
Transp. v. Rowe, 356 N.C. 671, 675-76, 459 S.E.2d 203, 207-08 (2001) (holding that where
there are equal protection challenges, formulas for just compensation are governed by
rational basis review). Equal protection constitutional analysis requires only that a law
have a rational basis in a legitimate governmental interest. Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 683,
562 S.E.2d at 91. This "rational basis scrutiny" applies when the law does not target a
suspect class or impair a fundamental right. Id.
31. Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 683, 562 S.E.2d at 91 (referring to section 1D-25 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina).
32. § 1D-35(2)(i). This is generally the case in American jurisdictions. See DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(5) (2d ed. 1993); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 382 (2000).
33. Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621,626-27, 319 S.E.2d 217, 220-21 (1984).
But see George L. Priest, Insurabilityand Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 103335 (1989) (arguing against insurance for punitive damages as defeating their purpose). See
generally § 58-7-15(13) (authorizing liability insurance for professional negligence).
34. Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 683,562 S.E.2d at 91.
35. § 1D-5(7); see also Brian Timothy Beasley, North Carolina's New Punitive
Damages Statute: Who's Being Punished Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2176 (1996)
(outlining the general statutory framework of section 1D).
36. § 1D-15(b).
37. Id. § 1D-15(a).

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
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same legislature and sponsored by Republican Representative
Charles Neely.3" The General Assembly added medical malpractice
to the list of pleadings that must be pled specially under Rule 9(j). 3 9
This amendment to Rule 9 mandates that the plaintiff specify in his

pleadings the names of witnesses reasonably expected to testify as
experts at trial under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence. n0
Evidence Rule 702 sets out a series of requirements for an expert

witness in a medical malpractice case." This rule has the cumulative

effect of holding the medical expert to a higher professional standard

than the typical expert witness qualification standard.4 2 Read
together, Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j) and Rule of Evidence 702 are
designed to lower the number of malpractice cases actually filed, let
alone actually litigated. 3

II.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND ECONOMIC COST

Medical malpractice litigation ha's become such a lightening rod
because of the extraordinary cost of health care and the potential for
The costs
large damages associated with physical injuries.'
associated with health care have risen rapidly in the last few
decades.4 5 In the last twenty years, health care expenditures in the

38. See Joseph Neff, In N.C., Lawsuit Reforms Would Affect Only a Few Cases, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 11, 1995, at 1A; see also Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309,
sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 309 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 9 (1996))
(documenting the General Assembly's passage of the amendment to Rule 9, requiring
specificity in medical malpractice suits).
39. Sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws at 309 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule
9(j)).
40. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j).
41. Id. § 8C-1, Rule 702.
42. Id. § 8C-1, Rule 702; see also Neff, supra note 38. (reporting on the proposed bills
relating to tort reform and medical malpractice).
43. See Keith v. N. Hosp. Dist. of Surry County, 129 N.C. App. 402, 405, 499 S.E.2d
200, 202 (1998) (discussing the policy objectives of medical malpractice reform in these
statutes); see also David Burt Arrington, Comment, Keith v. Northern Hospital District of
Surry County and Rule 9(j): Preventing Frivolous Medical Malpractice Claims at the
Expense of North Carolina Courts' Equitable Powers, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2303, 2309-19
(1999) (commenting on the Keith court's interpretive approach to statutory construction in
reference to Evidence Rule 702 and Civil Procedure Rule 9(j) and its usage of legislative
history and policy objectives).
44. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., MEASURE OF MALPRACIICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 2-5 (1993).
45. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES

287 (2002) (comparing the rise in United States expenditures on health care with that of
other industrialized countries).
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United States have quintupled,46 reaching $1.3 trillion in 2000.47
Given that the gross domestic product amounted to approximately
$9.8 trillion that year, 8 this figure represents a staggering 13% of the
activity in the formal economy. Further, the high compensatory
damage awards that are possible in malpractice cases reflect the
importance of medicine to the rest of the economy in terms of its
fundamental impact on worker productivity, quality of life, and
individual independence.49
Not surprisingly, medical malpractice insurance costs have risen
along with the trend in health care costs." For example, obstetrics
and gynecology, a particularly vulnerable specialty, currently
struggles with insurance premiums that can sometimes reach 20% or
more of gross revenues." More generally, the increase in malpractice
insurance rates in the last few years has become a minor crisis in
medicine:
Medical malpractice premiums are soaring at the highest rate
since the mid-1980s, adding to rising health care costs. Insurers
say the increases, typically in the double digits, result mainly
from a rise in jury awards now averaging $3.45 million. Some of
the biggest insurers are raising rates in many states more than
30 percent. Even insurers owned by doctors and hospitals,
which strive to keep rates low, are increasing prices 10 percent
to 18 percent ....

Phico, which sells malpractice insurance

nationally but concentrates on New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
was taken over in August by regulators in Pennsylvania, where
it is based, when claims threatened to outrun the company's
ability to pay. Later in the month, another big company, the
46. See id. at 291 (reporting that national health expenditures rose from $245.8 billion
in 1980 to $1.299 trillion in 2000).
47. Id.
48. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2002 HISTORICAL TABLES,

BUDGET OFTHE U.S. GOV'T, H.R. Doc. No. 107-3, vol. IV, at 182 (2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Richard L. Gundling, Rising Healthcare Spending Gives
Pause to Congressand the Public, 56 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 76, 76 (2002).
49. See, e.g., HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, LETHAL MEDICINE:

THE EPIDEMIC OF

MALPRACTICE IN AMERICA 1-3 (1993) (illustrating the personal impact that health care
has on all areas of life). See generally CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH
CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 16.91-92 (2d ed. 1999) (providing an overview of the
damages available in negligence actions in North Carolina).
50. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 44, at 2-5.
51. Diane Levick, Insurers Squeeze State's Doctors: Malpractice Rates Increasing,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 2002, at Al (reporting that Connecticut's malpractice
insurance experience follows the national trend upward); see also Joseph B. Treaster,
MalpracticeRates Are Rising Sharply: Health Costs Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at
Al (discussing the increasing rates nationwide); NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITAL ASSOC.,
supra note 11 at 1 (reporting the rise in premiums faced by hospitals in 2002).
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Frontier Insurance Group, based in Rock Hills, N.Y., was taken
over by New York regulators.52
Opinions differ on the economic basis of malpractice premium
increases. Tort reform advocates often point to rising jury verdicts in
malpractice cases as the fundamental reason for the malpractice
insurance rate surges. According to Michael Klein, Vice-President of
Underwriting for Global Health Care of St. Paul, "[r]ates are rising so
sharply because soaring jury awards and settlement amounts are
driving up insurers' losses ....'[b]oth verdicts and settlements have
more than doubled between 1994 and 1999 .....

Plaintiff advocates explain the trend differently. Much of the
extraordinary increase has come after a multiple year bear market
that played havoc with the forecasts of so many financial products
companies.54 This may partially explain the malpractice insurance
rate increases. Medical malpractice insurers used their pools of
reserve cash to invest aggressively during the 1990's. 5 This allowed
the insurance carriers to lower premiums, based on the erroneous
belief that the market would stay high. 6 According to this theory,
when the market dropped, this poor planning resulted in sharply
increasing premiums.57
The actual explanation probably lies somewhere between these
two theories. In the short run, insurance costs are greatly impacted
by sudden, unexpected changes in the economic environment. 8 In
the long run, though, malpractice premiums will be fundamentally
52. Treaster, supra note 51; see also Kevin M. Bingham, Risk Retention in a Hardening

Insurance Market, CONTINGENCIES, May/June 2002, at 66 (describing the impact of the
deterioration of the "insurance industry financial results" on a "tough insurance
purchasing environment").
53. Michael Prince, Rate Hikes Symptomatic, Bus. INS., June 11, 2001, at 3 (quoting
Michael Klein, Vice President of Global Health Care in St. Paul, Minnesota).
54. See PHICO Insurance Co. Ordered into Liquidation in Pennsylvania, MEALEY'S

LITIGATION REPORT: INSURANCE INSOLVENCY, Feb. 14, 2002, at 3 (analyzing the
financial history of an insurance company that went insolvent as a result of poor
forecasting).
55. Christopher Oster & Rachel Zimmerman, Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke
Malpractice Crisis,WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al.
56. Id.
57. See Mark Hollis, Doctors: Patients Payingfor Crisis, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 2,
2003, at B1 ("[M]any consumer advocates and trial lawyers say bad medical care and bad
business practices of insurance companies are mostly to blame for skyrocketing insurance
rates-and limiting jury awards, they say, won't solve those problems."); Pully, supra note
9, at 37 (blaming the poor financial markets and medical malpractice insurance industry
"failures" for part of the increases in premiums).
58. See generally WEILER ET AL., supra note 44, at 3 (describing the short run effects

of industry-wide decisions and market changes on premiums).

2380

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

dependent on malpractice liability figures and not macroeconomic or
economic forecasting trends.5 9 Regardless of the exact balance of

factors, medical malpractice litigation is an important part of an
industry that now, on the whole, claims well over ten percent of the
gross domestic product.'
III. MODELING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A.

Goals of the Model

Modeling punitive damages in malpractice actions requires
finding the optimal level of deterrence to induce the health care
provider to act efficiently. This means that the marginal social costs
should equal the marginal social benefits in the best policy
formulation.61
The model should also take into account the

practicalities of litigation costs, victims' incentives to act responsibly,
the public's confidence in the system, the defendant health care
provider's wealth, and the current state of North Carolina law.

There are several basic economic models of punitive damage
regimes.62 All of the models involve generic tort situations.

None

specifically address any of the unique issues of medical malpractice,
such as the professional standard of care, the lack of any provision in
the statute for providers and patients to contract for a lower level of
service,63 the substantial information asymmetry between the
59. Id. at 3-4.
60. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "PatientProtection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5
n.24 (1999) (reporting various studies that peg health care as currently exceeding ten
percent of the national economy); supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
61. Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigmof Efficiency in Tort Law,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (1987).

See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (6th ed. 2003) (defining social optimality as occurring when
marginal social costs equal marginal social benefits).
62. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (arguing for the use of punitive
damages when the risk of liability for the defendant is less); David D. Haddock et al., An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1990) (justifying punitive damages in the case where it is cheaper for defendant to take
property than negotiate); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damagesfor Deterrence: When and
How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989) (presenting a basic model for defining the
scope of punitive damages); David Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive
Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1125 (1989) (modeling a justification for punitive damages);
Johnston, supra note 60 (theoretically justifying the use of punitive damages to create an
efficient tort system); Cooter, supra note 1 (defining the role of punitive damages in
creating an efficient result); Priest, supra note 3 (justifying punitive damages theory under
enterprise liability theory).
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2001) (including no provision for lowering this
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providers and patients in the technical details of and expectations
about medical care, and the potential for medical trauma to affect the
patient's strength and will to pursue claims.'
Further, economic
modeling of specific state punitive damages laws has not yet become
part of the law and economics literature, so this Comment will
attempt a number of novel projects while seeking a deeper
understanding of this issue.
While the reasonable person standard in negligence cases
explicitly takes into account the efficiency of the defendant's
precautionary burden, the malpractice standard defines the
precautionary measure by statute. Thus, the efficiency of the
defendant's behavior is not generally litigated in determining liability
in a malpractice case. Generic models of negligence law, of which
professional malpractice is a part,65 make the assumption that the
applicable legal standard is Judge Learned Hand's formula that if the
burden of precaution is lower than the probability of punishment
multiplied by foreseeable harm, the defendant is liable.66
This model operates under the assumption that juries are
rational if evidence law and jury instructions accurately reflect good
law and policy. Professor Neil Vidmar argues that juries tend to
reach the right conclusion, as based on the Hand formula standard,
especially in the area of compensatory liability assessment, more
often than may be commonly believed.67

baseline level of care by contract).
64. See infra notes 170-85.
65. William 0. Morris, The Negligent Nurse-The Physician and the Hospital, 33
BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1981); see DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 32,
§ 242 (stating that medical malpractice is a negligence action).
66. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Professor Cooter, for example, uses the Hand formula in his negligence model. Cooter,
supra note 1, at 1151.
67. VIDMAR, supra note 15, at 266-77 (attempting an explanation as to why "the
widespread claims of jury errancy [are] so out of line with empirical reality"). Vidmar's
study of North Carolina juries asserts that the evidence suggests juries assess damages
relatively accurately. Id. at 234-35. Likewise, based on studies in North Carolina and
other states, punitive damage awards do not appear to be out of the bounds of rationality.
Id. at 254-57. But see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Six State Case
Studies Show Claims and Insurance Costs Still Rise Despite Reforms 1, 40 (1986) (Sup.
Docs. No. GA1.13:HRD-87-21) (reprinting an assertion made by the North Carolina
Hospital Association Trust Fund that "[o]ften awards have little relationship to the
seriousness of the injury. This is no way to predict how a jury will rule on a particular set
of facts. Often awards bear no relationship to economic losses .... [t]oday juries often
make awards regardless of the 'fault' of anyone .... ).
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The Model

With the above concerns in mind, Professor Robert D. Cooter's
basic model of punitive damages in negligence law 68 serves as a
convenient starting point for modeling punitive damages in a
malpractice case. In his more general study on punitive damage
theory, Cooter includes a model of negligent behavior within a typical
American negligence liability system. He begins with the Hand
formula:
(1) B < pL -)liable, or (2) B > pL --not liable,69 where B is the

marginal burden of precaution taken by the defendant, p is the
probability of harm to the plaintiff, and L is the plaintiff's loss due
to negligence.
Suppose, then, that not all tortfeasors who fail the Hand rule are
caught. The probability of the defendant being held liable is q.70
Therefore, the tortfeasor will face an expected liability of pLq, where
pL > pLq.71 The first potential justification for punitive damages to
achieve optimal deterrence follows from this inequality. By adding a
"punitive multiple, 72 equal to the inverse of q, the potential
tortfeasor once again faces the standard Hand formula:
68. Cooter, supra note 1, at 1149-59.
69. Id. at 1151; see also CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (explaining Judge Hand's
formulation of the negligence standard).
70. Cooter does not empirically justify that the probability of being held liable is less
than one. Cooter, supra note 1, at 1151. However, common sense says that the chances of
being caught for negligence are less than one hundred percent. See Robert J. Blendon et
al., Patient Safety: Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1933, 1935 (2002) (surveying physicians and laypersons regarding their
experience with what they consider medical errors and reporting that medical errors are
infrequently followed by malpractice lawsuits); see also David Brown, Checking Up on
Medical Mistakes, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at A6 (reporting on the New England
Journal of Medicine study). The Washington Post article discusses some of the main
survey results succinctly:
About seven percent of physicians and ten percent of the general public say that
someone in their family has died as the result of preventable errors in their
medical care, according to a new survey.
A higher fraction of each group-twelve percent of doctors and seventeen
percent of the public-reported that they or a relative had suffered a medical
error serious enough to cause them to lose time from school or work.
In all, thirty-five percent of physicians and forty-two percent of the public said
they had experienced a medical error themselves, or had one affect a family
member. Eighteen percent of physicians and twenty-four percent of the public
said the errors had serious consequences.
Id.
71. See Cooter, supra note 1,at 1151.
72. Id.
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B < pLqm,7 3 where m=1/q.

Tort law does not, as a general matter, include the likelihood of
being caught in formulating damage awards.7 4 Interestingly, this
differs significantly from criminal liability regimes. In criminal law,
the State generally assigns a punishment based on the severity of the
offense. However, the State also imposes punishment greater than
the severity of the offense for offenders who have a low probability of
being caught.75
Imposing a high punishment in this regard
compensates for the State's failure to catch all offenders.76 For
example, if the chance of being caught cheating on one's taxes were
lower than one hundred percent, the optimal punishment would be
higher than the amount the taxpayer filched from the government.77
The goal of this Comment's tort law model will, like the criminal law
model, be to induce the self-interested profit maximizer78 to act
efficiently so as never to commit gross negligence.
Medical malpractice introduces a twist into this generic concept.
The North Carolina malpractice statute, like medical malpractice law
around the nation,79 requires that the health care provider act
according to the standard practice for the given health care service. 0
Therefore, the defendant is not required to guard against pL, but it
must meet the burden of complying with an acceptable local8'
practice, £. Patients implicitly contract with the health care provider,
expecting that the provider will faithfully follow standard procedures.
Few patients have the expertise necessary to determine which
provider is providing an optimal level of care for a given medical
ailment, so a statutory standard of care may be the most efficient way
to define the parties' expectations.82
The nursing home, for example, will profit maximize at a level
that satisfies the inequality.
73. See id. (m = 1/q).
74. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (failing
to include any provision in the negligence standard for the probability of being caught).
75. POSNER, supra note 61, §7.2; Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2082 (1998).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. The self-interested profit maximizer in this model acts rationally to maximize its
own self-interest when faced with a given set of budget-limiting cost constraints.
79. See DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS, supranote 32, § 244.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2001).
81. See id. (requiring the medical provider to comply with "standards of practice.., in
the same or similar communities).
82. See POSNER, supra note 61, § 6.3.
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B > £qm.

By satisfying this condition, it will avoid liability that results in lower
net profits either through payment of damages or increased insurance
premiums. The next step in modeling the nursing home's incentive
structure is to design an equation for its total expected costs (EC), in
order to assess how the nursing home will respond to the liability
exposure. Let b denote the "unit cost of precaution" and x denote
the amount of precaution the nursing home takes.83 This becomes a
more explicit function for B, the home's total burden:
(5) B = bx.84
For example, if a disabled nursing home patient is at risk for bed
sores, b would be the cost to the home of turning the patient,
checking for sores, and so on. The variable x would be the number of
times per day this precautionary procedure is done. The probability
of an accident, p, is a function of x85 and the victim's precautions, v.
In other words, the likelihood of a painful bed sore developing is
related to the number of times the patient is turned as well as any
precautionary conduct the patient might take, such as ringing for the
nurse if the patient notices a symptom of a developing bed sore.
The negligent nursing home will, viewing its obligations
prospectively, face the cost of its care plus the probability of being
held liable:
(6) EC = bx + fqm,86 where £ = p(x, v)L, and EC is the nursing

home's expected cost of providing care. £ = pL in this model by
definition.

This equation reflects an assumption that the legislature
successfully created a statutory standard of care that, from an
efficiency prospective, mimics the general Hand formula standard. In
other words, £ = pL where the accepted practice for a particular
medical field is for the health care provider to take precautions that
are equal to or greater than the probability times the magnitude of
harm to the patient. Relaxing the assumption would require
analyzing whether the invisible hand of the free market guides the
medical field at issue to act efficiently, which is what the legislature
presumably hopes will happen.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Cooter, supra note 1, at 1158 n.24.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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The two costs in Equation 6 are added together, because,
whether or not the nursing home is held liable (fqm), it is guaranteed
to incur the cost of doing business (bx).
Up to this point in the model, the cost to society when negligence
occurs, or the social cost (SC), will be similar to the defendant's
own-the costs of providing the care to the defendant plus the
probability times magnitude of harm. Given that the punitive
multiple (m) is one under the above regime (no provision for
damages larger than the compensatory loss), £qm is equal to the
potential plaintiff's loss. However, society, which is essentially the
injured party, faces neither a probability of being caught nor a
punitive multiplier. Regardless of whether the plaintiff ever recovers,
the plaintiff, a member of society, will suffer the loss. Likewise, a
punitive multiplier is irrelevant at this point to total social cost,
because it is merely a wealth transfer from the defendant to the
plaintiff. Overall, whether the plaintiff or the defendant has that sum
of money does not impact total social welfare. Total social welfare
generally decreases when an inefficient number of actual injuries
occur, not when there are only wealth transfers, assuming the
marginal utility of money is similar between parties. Therefore,
(7)

SC = bx + pL.

The costs to society are fully internalized by the potential defendant
when SC = EC. The nursing home will act to minimize all the costs to
society when it is ultimately responsible for all of the costs of
negligent injury and not just the costs of avoiding medical negligence:
(8)

bx + £qm = bx + pL.

Simplifying the equation gives:
(9)

£qm = pL

87. Canceling out the expression bx involves the assumption that the nursing home's
activity is never illegitimate in the way that the common law intentional tort of battery
often is. Many standard models of punitive damages justify punitive liability as being
necessary to offset a negative B, this is generally an activity in which the defendant goes
out of his way to create the harmful event and actually derives personal gain from
prosecuting the tort, such as the satisfaction of revenge or sadism. This differs from
ordinary negligence, which involves a positive but insufficiently large B. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 61, § 6.15 (defining the optimal punitive award as one that offsets a
negative B). The desire to deter intentional torts lies behind the common law tradition of
North Carolina, as well as the statutory standard for recovery of punitive damages. See
supra notes 28-29. This model is largely inapplicable to medical malpractice. Medical
practitioners almost never go out of their way to hurt patients. See, e.g., Tom Zucco, The
Sleepless Eye, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 18, 2002, at 1D (reporting that "abuse and
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If qm = 1, costs are internalized to the home when the statutory level
of care £ equals the loss pL, which was Judge Hand's objective in his
formula. However, when there are no punitive damages available to
the plaintiff, as when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate fraud, malice,
or willful or wanton conduct as required by statute,88 the optimal
standard of care is the following:
(10)

£ = pL/q.

Only when "the standards of practice among members of the
same health care profession"8 9 are pLq, or the invisible hand pushes
the standards of practice to a high enough standard that they account
for individual acts of negligence that go uncompensated will the local
practice standard (£) be at an efficient level. At an intuitive level, this
seems unlikely to happen. In addition to the basic difficulty of a
prospective patient assessing the known limits of the provider's
precautions against negligence, the uncompensated or unknown
negligence cannot be a factor in a patient's choice of providers. As an
illustration, a nursing home that gets away with negligence one
hundred percent of the time without any loss of reputation faces no
penalty in the market for new patients, so its lower standards would
bring down "the standards of practice"9 for its area of health care. In
other words, this scenario would create a serious impediment to the
free market, guiding the malpractice standard to an efficient level of

care.
Even when the plaintiff can prove an aggravating factor that
allows the jury to award punitive damages, the punitive damages cap
will limit the punitive multiplier that the trial court can apply. If the
amount of the punitive multipler is greater than the larger of three

neglect" is a serious problem, however, the instances of "abuse" reported are generally
extreme neglect as opposed to intent to cause harm).
In any event, an intentional harm would be a separate tort from malpractice. In a
model of intentional torts, in which the benefit that the tortfeasor gains from the tort is
considered illegitimate and, thus, of zero value, there would be no bx on the right, social
cost side of the equation. This is because bx would be negative; the tortfeasor would be
gaining instead of losing and so offsetting the victim's loss with his benefit. However,
because most accepted notions of human value would regard that benefit to be quite
worthless, the standard economic model of social utility does not include the tortfeasor's
gain in its computation of total social welfare. See POSNER, supra note 61, § 6.15. But see
Friedman, supra note 62, at 1128-32 (criticizing the assigning of zero benefit to
"'illegitimate satisfactions' "as "simply defining the problem out of existence").
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (2001) (requiring plaintiffs to show fraud, malice, or
willful or wanton conduct).
89. Id. § 90-21.12.
90. Id.

2003]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

2387

times compensatory damages L or $250,000, 1 the optimal standard of

care should be:
(11) £ = pL/qm, where m is the maximum punitive multiplier
allowed. 92

The significance of this result is that when there is a punitive damage

cap, the medical malpractice standard of care needs to be adjusted to
achieve optimal deterrence in this model. Without making that initial
result of the model a policy recommendation, it reflects the basic
point that there is an integrated relationship between the standard of
care and recovery amounts that can be expressed mathematically.
Social cost, however, is not limited to the victim's injury. Both
society and the parties themselves incur substantial litigation costs.
These costs are essential to the policy underpinnings of many tort
reform advocates.9 3 So, adding them to the model, while not a typical

feature of punitive damages models, is important to the analysis: 94
(12) bx + £qm + cd(x) = bx + pL + [c,(x) + cd(x) + cg(x)], where
Cd(x) is the cost to the defendant of handling a claim,

c(x) is the cost to the plaintiff of handling a claim, and
cg(x) is the cost to the government of handling a claim, through
court costs and enforcement of the result.

91. Id. § 1D-25(b).
92. The punitive damage award in the absence of the cap would be mL, or (1/q)L.
However, mL cannot be more than the greater of $250,000 or 3L. Id. Therefore, m will
either be $250,000/L or 3, depending on which kind of punitive damages cap the particular
case triggers.
93. See, e.g., Lloyd M. Krieger, Editorial, Doctors Belong in Hospitals, Not
Courtrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at A21 (citing the expense of dealing with potential
malpractice liability as part of the need for reform); Richard G. Roberts, Understanding
the Physician Liability Insurance Crisis, FAM. PRAC. MGMT., Oct. 2002 at 47 ("Physicians
who are sued for malpractice spend an average one week of their professional life dealing
with the claim."). But see id. ("The most important factor in rising medical liability
premiums appears to be the size of the awards, rather than the frequency of lawsuits.")
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has also noted the importance of minimizing
litigation expenses in the legislature's approach to medical malpractice tort reform,
lending this aspect of the model further support. See Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626,
636, 325 S.E.2d 469, 476-77 (1985) (noting the importance of efficiency in litigation while
also not deterring valid claims); see also Rhyne v. K-Mart, 149 N.C. App. 672, 683-84, 562
S.E.2d 82, 91 (2002) (rejecting a due process challenge to the punitive damages cap
because the legislature could reasonably have believed that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 bore
a rational relationship to promoting economic development by limiting punitive damages).
94. See generally POSNER, supra note 61, § 21.4 (including litigation costs in a model
of how claims settle in tort law).
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C. Existence Value, the Other Social Cost
Finally, social cost also involves the effect of the injury on others.
There are two types of costs associated with an injury. First, there are
liabilities that can be recovered under the rubric of compensatory
damages, such as medical expenses, lost wages, loss of consortium,
pain and suffering, and wrongful death.95 However, injuries have
many other social costs beyond those incurred directly by the
plaintiff. Most of the other social costs, like the pain and suffering of
family and friends in response to a loved one's injury, are not
recoverable because there is no duty to prevent the pain and suffering
of third persons.96 But, there is an added layer of social cost that is
recoverable when the injury occurs in particularly egregious
situations. Those familiar with an injury not only feel sorrow for the
victim, they also tend to feel a sense of outrage toward the
defendant. 97 In the nursing home hypothetical, if the health care
facility exhibits particularly wanton neglect of a patient or
fraudulently withholds services or information, such behavior shocks
the conscience of those who discover it. This sort of shocking
behavior, perhaps not coincidentally, also gives rise to potential
liability for punitive damages in North Carolina.98
Societal outrage is generally couched in terms of fairness, not
efficiency. As such, it is the type of justification for punitive damages
that economists tend to ignore or criticize as muddling economics'
central issue, optimized allocation of resources. 99 Unfortunately,
however, the standard economic response to fairness arguments is
patently inadequate. Breaches of fairness are real, tangible costs to
society, and fully deserve to be part of an economic model.
Fortunately, fairness and outrage can in fact be accounted for
under what is generally known as "existence value."' 100 Existence
value typically shows up in economic modeling of environmental
issues. For instance, the value of preserving the Alaska National
95. See generally DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 49, § 16.91-92 (providing an overview
of damages allowed in North Carolina for negligence actions).
96. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) ("[It is necessary to find some definite relation between the
parties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act.").
97. See Sunstein et al., supra note 75, at 2075.
98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (2001).
99. See POSNER, supra note 61, § 2.2. Judge Posner notes that "justice and fairness
are not economic terms" and that concepts of fairness surrounding any particular case are
generally subordinated to overall fairness for an entire legal system. Id.
100. Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care,
8 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3, 4-5 (1994).
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Wildlife Refuge is principally a question of existence value. Few
Americans ever visit this refuge, and it is not a particularly critical
area in terms of its ecological impact on the contiguous forty-eight
states. Nevertheless, despite the valuable oil that lies below the
surface, Congress has considered the refuge sufficiently important to
be preserved intact.''
Probably the most accurate economic
explanation for this policy choice is existence value-while very few
Americans will ever get any tangible benefit from the preservation of
the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, many feel good knowing that it
has been safeguarded.
Likewise, there can be existence value for patients in the nursing
home. Friends, family, and the public at large, value that the elderly
are well cared for in the home. When this expectation of care is
breached, they feel terrible for the victim. When the breach is
aggravated, the feeling that someone has been wronged is often
palpable and acute. Like the positive existence value that many
people have for environmental preservation, the negative existence
value when there is an outrageous breach of "fairness" should have a
place in the economic analysis of torts. At present, the scholarly
literature regarding economic analysis of punitive damages, and even
criminal law, does not employ the concept of existence value in its
efficiency discussions, even though this is a critical part of the punitive
damages statute. °" The neglect of existence value as a concept in tort
and criminal law may largely explain the wide gulf between advocates
for economic efficiency and those who critique them on fairness
grounds. This Comment's model seeks to begin to bridge that gap in
a legal area that has a great need for unifying the concepts of fairness
and efficiency.
The question, then, is where does one draw the line about how
much the law should account for existence value in meting out
damage awards? In modeling the statutory framework, the answer
comes from the legislature. Because North Carolina allows punitive
damages only for egregious conduct and not ordinary negligence, 03
the legislature has implied that moral outrage is the threshold for
101. See Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and
Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1994) (outlining the history of the
preservation of lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System, including the Alaska
National Wildlife Refuge and quoting one proponent's assertion that preserving it was
"perhaps the greatest conservation achievement of this century").
102. Cf § ID-35. (listing factors the state considers important in determining punitive
damages awards).
103. Id. § 1D-15(a).
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awarding damages. 1°4
Ordinary unhappiness associated with
another's injury would be incredibly difficult to quantify and
articulate, either by theorizing or by the jury in a real case. 105 On the
other hand, moral outrage is something that a jury may feel more
personally and, in a sense, be able to quantify more precisely than

ordinary unhappiness. The jury, for example, acts as the conscience
of the community in criminal cases when considering the death
1 Punitive damages are awarded in a similar manner in that
penalty. 06
the jury is asked to bring its own moral valuation into its deliberations
1
when assessing the punishment. 07
Further, the sense that the
community's moral law has been broken is a more objective criterion,
such that existence value begins to acquire a structure that a jury
could articulate in its deliberations.
Probably for this reason, the General Assembly, following the
common law of the state,0 8 has allowed punitive awards in the case of
willful or wanton behavior while prohibiting punitive damages in
ordinary negligence cases. 109 Moral outrage, 11° or negative existence
value, is a decreasing function, p, of the defendant's level of care x.1
As defined by the statute,"l2 p is to be zero unless x is below the level
104. See id.
105. Cf. William H. Desvousges, et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with
Contingent Valuation, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91, 91-93 (Jerry A. Hausman ed.,
1993) (critiquing the accuracy of attempts to quantify empirically the existence value of
natural resources).
106. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (2001) (discussing the role of the jury
in a death penalty case).
107. § 1D-35(2)(a); David Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 31, 31-32 (2002) (presenting the results of a
study that found that juries have difficulty putting a dollar value on outrage in a controlled
experimental setting).
108. See Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 339 N.C. 338, 348-49, 452 S.E.2d
233, 239 (1994) (discussing the aggravation element required to obtain punitive damages
for the torts of assault and battery).
109. See § 1D-15 (specifying the standards for requiring punitive damages); Cass R.
Sunstein, To Punish or Not?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 75, 75 (2002)
(noting the general rule that ordinary negligence does not create a cause of action for
punitive damages).
110. See generally Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413, 416-17, 107 S.E. 577, 578-79 (1921)
(associating outrage with punitive damages); Snyder v. Newell, 132 N.C. 614, 622, 44 S.E.
354, 357 (1903) (Clark, C.J., concurring) (stating that "exemplary damages" are really
grounded not in the loss of honor to the plaintiff but "the outrage perpetrated"). These
cases exemplify North Carolina's long-standing common law position that punitive
damages are not super-compensatory damages for the plaintiff but damages that reflect a
more general moral outrage.
111. The level of care can be considered to encompass a sliding scale of behavior from
extraordinary care (a high value for b) to intentional harm (a negative value for b).
112. See § 1D-1.
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that triggers a valid claim for punitive damages. In other words, any
negative existence value resulting from ordinary negligence is
irrelevant, but once the defendant's conduct becomes sufficiently
offensive, punitive damages come into play.
Existence value tort law can also be found in another important
form. A critical part of understanding the tort reform statutes
involves the support in the legislature for business generally and, in
particular, health care providers." 3 Achieving an efficient damage
award should take into account the general support in the community
for businesses not having to pay enormous punitive damage awards or
face routine exposure to the threat of punitive damages when they
commit torts. Medical malpractice statutes reflect the general
recognition of the difficulty of providing health care and a desire that
providers not be subjected to constant litigation.
This analysis raises the question of what constitutes the best
punitive damage award. If one defines the optimal punitive damages
regime as that which the legislature has enacted, an existence value
component in the model might negate any reason for using an
economic model to make policy recommendations. This is because
the public's perception of what would be most efficient, as expressed
in the legislature's decision, becomes the definition of efficiency. If
the legislature expresses the community's values accurately, any
departures that the statute might have from pure economic efficiency,
in terms of costs to the defendant versus risks and magnitude of harm
to the plaintiff, would tend to be explained by this vague fairness
consideration. If the statute punished the defendant by more than the
actual harm to the plaintiff, for example, one could explain it as the
legislature wanting to punish the defendant more based on the
negative impact its tort had on the existence value cost to the
community.
The proper way to evaluate existence value is not to go so far as
to create that tautology," 4 but merely to account for the desires of the
public to foster a society in which medical malpractice litigation is
113. Presumably, the legislature's policy preferences and "existence value" reflects
those of the people. Indeed, the whole point of the national "Contract with America" and
the state "Contract for the People, by the People" was to set a mandate for the new
representatives. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. As such, North Carolina
tort reform laws, among the first to be passed after the 1994 elections, are a particularly
convenient case study in the existence values of the electorate finding their way into new
laws.
114. In other words, it is important that existence value not automatically be used to
explain all divergences between what juries do and what the efficient result would be when
only analyzing the private welfare of the plaintiff and defendant.
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relatively minimal."' The rest of the public's concern for efficiency
should be modeled more explicitly in terms of the standard variables
for loss due to injury, litigation costs, the burden on the defendant,
etc." 6 Legislating is neither a ,perfect science nor always a process
creating perfect consistency across all the statutes that govern any
particular area of law. Hopefully, designing economic models of law
that include existence value can still be a useful project, even as they
acquire an extra layer of deference to the popular view that produced
any given legislation.
The fact that the entire punitive damages amount goes to the
plaintiff and not to other members of society is problematic. One
explanation for this approach is that those who are outraged would
want the plaintiff to receive the damages when the defendant is held
liable. Existence value is a peculiar phenomenon in that it, by its very
nature, involves valuation of goods from which the person does not
expect to derive any benefit. This theory is unique in that it involves
valuation of a harm, not a good. In the case of goods, such as an
environmental good, efficient social policy can account for existence
value by protecting the resource. In the case of a harm, such as
injuries caused by outrageous acts, the injury to society involves
society's moral code and the acute concern that others have for the
injured party. Society's concern for the plaintiff supports the
community's preference that the plaintiff receive the damages.
The injury to society's moral fiber reflected in the jury's decision
on awarding punitive damages is of a slightly different nature. Insofar
as the defendant's breach of the moral code is rooted in a concrete
injury to the plaintiff, that supports the plaintiff receiving the punitive
damages penalty. However, there remains the basic point that the
115. Accounting for negative existence value due to outrage toward a defendant

without also including the negative existence value resulting from general litigiousness
would stack the analytical deck unfairly. While existence value analysis is unpleasantly
imprecise and threatens the fundamental economic project of lending methodical clarity to
policy discussion, omitting it entirely would likewise inhibit truly comprehensive economic
modeling. Indeed, critics, such as Professor Singer of Harvard Law School, attempt to
limit the extent of the applicability of law and economics on fairness grounds. See Joseph
William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103,10330 (2002) (attacking major scholars in the field of law and economics as unacceptably
disregarding fairness). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (2001) (defending the law and economics perspective and

arguing that welfare, not fairness, should govern legal policy analysis). The position of this
Comment is that law and economics critics are too quick to criticize a mode of analysis
that is not inherently flawed but rather too often improperly put into practice.
116. Stated in econometric terms, if the model were to account for economic efficiency
in both the explicit terms and in the p function, it would fail because of the colinearity
error; multiple independent variables would be accounting for the same phenomenon.
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defendant's conduct is fundamentally a public cost to society. There
are two ways to award punitive damages-allowing the plaintiff to
keep the entire award, and allocating all or a portion of the award to
a public coffer," 7 such as one designed to prevent future medical

errors. The former solution has the advantage of simplicity and ease
of administration, while the latter has the advantage of avoiding
unjust enrichment and compensating society for what is in essence a
public cost. Answering that question is beyond the scope of this
model, which is focused on optimal deterrence and economic

efficiency.
The function for society's existence value, p, should include the
public's concern for the expense that health care professionals incur
as a result of medical malpractice suits, Cd, as well as the public's
outrage at instances of reckless medical malpractice, x. Thus, the
basic model for setting private expected costs equal to social costs

becomes:
(13) bx +.£qm + c, = bx + pL + c + c +cd + P(x, Cd), where p(x, c)
is the negative existence value associated with both the egregious
nature of the tort itself and the undesirable expense of medical
malpractice litigation."'
D. DeterrenceBenefits, the Other Externality

One of the fundamental purposes of the tort system is deterring
future negligent acts.119 Deterrence, however, is rarely a benefit to
117. See Bass v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 42 Wisc. 654, 678 (1877) (Ryan, C.J., concurring).
Chief Judge Ryan commented that "it is equally difficult to understand why, if the
tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated
sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished." Id. Plans to award a
percentage of punitive damage awards to the state have met with mixed success in
constitutional challenges. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(holding that a defendant's wrongful acts warranted a deterrent remedy; but, affirming the
district court's imposition of a constructive trust over the defendant's profits instead of a
punitive damages remedy to avoid unjust enrichment); Kirk v. Denver Pub. Co., 818 P.2d
262 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a Colorado statute reserving one-third of punitive awards to
the state violates the Takings Clause of both the federal and state constitutions); Gordon
v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding Florida law requiring that sixty
percent of punitive awards go to the state under the Takings Clause and Due Process
Clause analysis).
118. By definition, p'(x) <_0, and p'(c,) _<0. This means that both functions are
decreasing functions.
119. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 670 F. Supp. 630, 636-37 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (noting that deterrence is a fundamental policy justification for punitive damages in
medical malpractice), affid in part and rev'd in part, 849 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1988); see also
Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 501, 501 (1797) (constituting the Supreme Court
of North Carolina's first pronouncement on the reasons for "exemplary damages"
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the plaintiff, nor is it an explicit part of tort litigation, 120 aside from
punitive damage trials, which in North Carolina are authorized
to
121 If
damages.
punitive
litigating
in
issues
deterrence
for
account
there were no deterrence effect, tort litigation would largely be an
expensive and wasteful method of wealth transfer from defendants to
plaintiffs and from both parties to their lawyers. The deterrence
value of a lawsuit, or even the threat of a suit, is an essential
justification for devoting so many costly resources to tort litigation. 2
In health care tort litigation, the deterrence of a defendant being held
liable is mainly a benefit to potential future patients, not the plaintiff
patient, who has already suffered the loss.
The value of a defendant being held liable in a particular case
provides a critical link to the success of the tort system in that
successful lawsuits signal the cost of tortious activity to the health care
provider. It also may notify potential patients that the provider is an
undesirable source of treatment. If there was a statute recognizing a
victim of abuse's right of action under which no victims had ever
sued, the statute would provide some deterrence to the health care
provider because the right of action still exists. This illustrates the
independent deterrent value of a successful tort action. However, the
statute would be far less successful in its deterrent effect if the
providers knew that no one had ever prevailed and thus perceived it
to be powerless. Therefore, a successful claim benefits people other
than the plaintiff both by alerting them to a provider's tort, alerting
them to an information benefit, and sending a warning to other
providers as to the potential costs of negligent care. The deterrence
benefit is relevant to this Comment's model because one of the
model's fundamental goals is to create an optimal incentive structure
when there is potential that some negligence will be unremedied, as
discussed in Section III.B. Nursing homes are a potential problem
area in this respect because of the great knowledge gap between
according to the state's common law, including deterrence of future wrongful conduct).
120. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(explaining that negligence weighs risks and burdens of the parties, not the value of future
deterrence).
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (2001) ("Punitive damages may be awarded ... to
punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others
from committing similar wrongful acts."); id. § 1D-35 (requiring the fact finder to consider
the purposes of punitive damages as codified in § 1D-1, but not including a subsection that
authorizes the admission of evidence to prove the possibility of punitive damages
deterring future wrongful activity).
122. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 578-79 (1997) (pointing
out that deterrence is a social benefit of litigation).
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providers and patients.123 Therefore, whether or not a nursing home
has suffered an adverse judgment in a medical malpractice trial would
be particularly useful to prospective residents. The deterrence
function, D, depends primarily on the probability of liability for
negligence, q, and the damage award when that occurs, mL, in this
model. Because this deterrence offsets the social costs of litigation, it
is subtracted from the social cost side of the equation:
(14) bx + £qm + c =bx + pL + c, + cg+

C + p - D(q, m, L),
where D(q, m, L) equals deterrence as a function of the
probability of being held liable, the punitive multiplier, and

compensatory damage liability. 2 4

IV. THE BOTrOM LINE: FINDING THE RIGHT POLICIES
A state has several policy choices in the medical malpractice

model:

it can set the standard of care, 25 the rules for pleading

claims, 2 6

the rules of evidence, 2 7 a standard for punitive damages, 28
and a limit on punitive damages. 2 9 In addition to the victim's injury,

medical malpractice also has two types of social costs: (1) litigation
and enforcement costs that accrue to the parties and the government
and (2) the deterioration of existence value. North Carolina's
approach for minimizing these social costs has been to control
litigation and enforcement costs with medical malpractice statutes
that restrict access to the courts. 130 Other existence values that the
legislature has acted on, pro-business sentiment and public moral
outrage, are codified in the punitive damage statutes that recognize,
but limit, punitive damage recovery. 3 '

123. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 8, at 147.
124. D' > 0 for all three independent variables.
125. E.g., § 90-21.12 (codifying a professional standard of care for medical malpractice
claims).
126. E.g., id. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (setting special pleading requirements for malpractice
claims).
127. E.g., id. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (defining who may give expert testimony in a medical
malpractice action).
128. E.g., id. § 1D-15 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or
willful or wanton conduct).
129. E.g., id. § 1D-25(b) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of three times
compensatory damages or $250,000).
130. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. There also may be some measure
of pro-defendant sympathy or existence value associated with these statutes.
131. See supra notes 18-37.
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Defining the Standardof Care

For the present purpose, court costs should be factored into the
optimal standard of care analysis, 3 2 as opposed to the optimal
punitive liability analysis. The goal of the standard of care, again, is
to deter defendants from acting inefficiently.'33 The Hand formula
balances the burden of the defendant against the potential injury of
the plaintiff. The malpractice standard merely employs another
mechanism to push injuries down to an efficient level, considering
that only these two parties in privity with each other. The Hand
formula does not account for litigation costs or the utility of the
34
defendant's conduct.1
Equation (12) fulfills this purpose. It includes court costs, given
their impact on the parties directly involved-plaintiff, defendant,
and government-while not including the existence value
externalities.'
The following equation represents the most efficient
standard of care, evaluated only in the context of the parties involved.
Solving for £, the statutory standard of care that the heath care
provider must meet, and defining m, for the moment, to be one, gives:
pL + (cp +

cg)
q
Subtracting the deterrence value of the lawsuit from the social
costs side of the equation yields the following standard of care:
(15)

fL+(CP+Cg
q

D.

This expression is fairly clear: the statutory level of care should be
the Hand formula's pL, or potential injury to the patient, plus net
court costs minus the deterrence value of the case to society. The
132. See supra notes 93-94. Professor Shavell attacks the current tort law system as not
sufficiently internalizing the costs of litigation. Shavell, supra note 122, at 579. In
particular, he points out litigation and enforcement costs to society and the value of
deterrence are externalities or values outside the contract's control. Id. at 579-80.
133. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. (articulating the deterrence goals of the
model's standard of care); see also Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive
Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (1989)
(contending that an economic approach to tort law must assume that deterrence is a
"singular policy concern" of tort laws and discussing the economic approach to tort law).
134. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 32, §§ 144-45.
135. An externality is any cost or benefit that accrues to someone who is not a party to
a particular transaction. Mauro Bussani, et al, Liabilityfor Pure FinancialLoss in Europe:
An Economic Restatement, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 113, 131 (2003). Existence value is,
virtually by definition, an externality.
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effect of q would be to increase the optimal level of care, as it will be

less than one in the real world.136 However, there is a good argument
that q, which again is the probability that the negligent nursing home
will actually be held liable, should not be included in the optimal level
of care analysis. 37 The formulas for £ determine when there is
compensatory damage liability. The dilemma is whether accounting
for enforcement shortfalls should raise the level of care or raise the

punitive liability exposure. If the latter, the vast majority of medical
malpractice cases, which do not involve punitive liability awards,' 38
Further, the State's punitive
would under-deter negligence.139
damages cap restricts the ability of the courts to craft punitive damage
awards so as to achieve optimal deterrence.

On the other hand, accounting for enforcement shortcomings by
requiring a higher standard of conduct raises serious issues of
fairness. The purpose of medical malpractice tort reform in North
Carolina was some combination of lowering the level of litigation and
freeing health care providers from the constant threat of liability that

136. Would q ever be greater than one? Potentially, it might, if defendants are held
liable more often than they are negligent. If juries were really irrational and subjected
health care providers to liability far more often than they deserved, q might well be
greater than one, if that phenomenon outweighed the instances of negligence untouched
by legal liability. However, as an empirical matter, most studies indicate that this is
unlikely to be the case. See VIDMAR, supra note 15 at 191-220 (discussing jury verdicts).
137. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 1149-59. Professor Cooter includes the probability
that the tortfeasor will be caught in his punitive damage equations, so it is not a part of his
definition of liability, which he takes to be exogenously given by the Hand formula. See
id. at 1151. His model therefore seems to call for punitive damages to be a regular feature
of liability, given that q is rarely one, though he does note the counterargument that, as a
practical matter, this may not be necessary. Id. at 1158. Of course, his model is very basic
and does not include other countervailing considerations, but, nevertheless, the model
implies that a much broader punitive damage regime than the one currently in place would
be more efficient. See generally Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 133, at 742-43 (noting
the similarities between tort law and criminal law but emphasizing that private remedies
are not intended to be all-encompassing as a general matter).
138. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1990) (reporting the results of a study that found that less than
three percent of successful malpractice verdicts include punitive damages awards);
Jonathan Turley, Editorial, Turning Patients into Hostages, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at
Bll (noting that only three percent of all medical malpractice cases end up with punitive
damages awarded).
139. This point operates under the assumption that expanding punitive liability would
involve awarding higher punitive damage awards to reflect a q < 1. Of course, another
method of accounting for q < 1 might be to lower the threshold for punitive liability,
whether by relaxing the "clear and convincing standard" or the required aggravating
factors. At this point, because a defendant can move for a bifurcated trial for punitive
damages, the added cost of the trial for punitive damages would offset to some extent the
social welfare gains from added deterrence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (2001).
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would result from high standards of conduct. 140 For that reason, let
141
q = m = 1 for the purpose of defining the optimal liability threshold.
Therefore, it is not necessary to require health care providers to
conform to higher standards because there may be uncompensated
negligence.
(16)

£=pL+(cP+cg)-D .42

This definition of £ stands contrary to the current statute.
Deterrence is an explicit part of punitive damage assessment in North
Carolina,' 43 but it is largely absent from the medical malpractice
standard of care.'" If changing the behavior of health care providers
is a primary function of medical malpractice law, the "local practice"
standard, 45 is a poor mechanism for achieving that goal. 46

140. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. The statutory standard of care is,
of course, a much blunter instrument than the above formulaic analysis. The best way to
account for the relationship of the formula to the real world of statutory construction is to
conceive of litigation costs, c,, as incorporating the costs of learning what the standard of
care is and predicting malpractice exposure. For example, if the state specified by statute
a level of care for every medical procedure in existence, it would cost potential defendants
enormous resources in navigating such a framework. It would also cost the government
enormously in maintaining such a system, so this cost would be reflected in c ,, also. For
that reason, the uniform standard approach may be the most efficient design for £. If the
statutory standard chronically underdeterred or overdeterred, it would be grounds for
adjusting the standard, even given its generic approach.
141. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 1151.
142. This standard of care definition defines a bit more precisely both the general
perception that malpractice litigation is out of control by controlling for the litigation costs
to the parties and the externality of enforcement costs. Thus, it attempts to turn the
critiques of Professor Shavell, who argues that the tort system inadequately accounts for
externalities, see Shavell, supra note 122, at 579, and the malpractice crisis critiques into a
new definition of care. Medical malpractice statutes afford the legislature the ability to
adjust the common law standard of care to achieve greater economic efficiency.
143. § 1D-1.
144. See id. § 90-21.12.
145. Id.
146. See N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 809.00-809.90 (1996) (providing jury
instructions for medical negligence, none of which includes any mention of the deterrence
function of the law in applying the standard of care). The North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instruction 809.00 reads, in relevant part, "Every health care provider is under a
duty... to provide health care in accordance with the standards of practice among
members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience situated
in the same or similar communities at the time the health care is rendered." Id. at 809.00;
see also Mark A. Hall & Michael D. Green, EmpiricalApproaches to Proving the Standard
of Care in Medical Malpractice Cases: Introduction, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 670
(2002) (noting the problem of "standard practice" standards of care is that they base "the
standard of care purely on how physicians actually behave will enshrine or immunize
medical practices that everyone agrees are bad and should be changed").
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B. Defining the Punitive DamagesMultiplier
Having attempted to define liability, the optimal punitive
147
damage multiplier is represented by the following formula:
m = [pL + (cp + Cg) - D] + h(cd)
[pL + (cp + cg) - D]q
The optimal punitive award will be mL, or the compensatory liability
multiplied by the punitive multiplier. This mathematical definition of
the optimal punitive multiplier would seem to suggest that punitive
liability should be a regular feature of jury awards. In reality, the
expression will tend to be less than or equal to one, which implies no
punitive damages. Where there is no outrageous conduct,148 the
formula reduces to the following expression:
(17)

(18)

pL+(Cp+c)-D+i(Ca)
+ g)-D+YC
m= L(pL( + (cp
+ C9) - D)q

Because the trigger for awarding punitive damages is when m > 1, this
149
occurs only when
(19)

pL+(Cp +g)-D+i(Cd)
pL+ (cp +cd) - D

> q.

This inequality illustrates how the negative existence value (p)
associated with high litigation diminishes the likelihood that the
multiplier will be greater than one. As long as the left side of
Inequality (19) is not greater than the probability of being held liable
147. In order to arrive at this formula for m, take Equation 12:
(11) bx + £qm + cd(x) = bx + p(x, v)L + c,(x) + c8(x), and solve for m:
pL+(c,- Cd)+Cg+J(XCd)
Next, eliminate reference to court and litigation costs, as they are accounted for in the
standard of care. Last, substitute the formula for £, Equation 14, into the equation to get
Equation (16).
148. p'(x) = 0, where x is greater than the punitive liability threshold in cases of
ordinary negligence.
149. The punitive multiplier is greater than one when the numerator is greater than the
denominator, or pL + (cp + c ) - D(q, m, L) + p(c) > [pL + (c, + cg) - D(q, m, L)]q. The
above formula is derived by algebraically solving for q.
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(q), there is no need for a multiplier in order to make the system
efficient. 150 Because q will generally be less than one, this only occurs
when p is large.
How does this balancing act comport with North Carolina law?
That question depends at least in part on an empirical question about
the values of each variable. If, for example, there is a chronic
problem of nursing homes acting negligently without detection, such
that q is particularly low, there would be an argument that punitive
liability should be expanded by increasing the types of behavior that
would trigger liability, decreasing the burden of proof required,
and/or increasing the amount of damages available to the plaintiff.
The expression that represents negative existence value presents
a dilemma for policy analysis. One could assume its existence and
recommend the best policy based on that assumption. Alternatively,
one could ignore existence value and attempt to create the most
efficient policy based on the other factors, and then seek to change
the public's "existence values" by advocating the new efficient
policy. 5 ' This Comment takes the position that some measure of the
public's values should be respected and duly entered into the model.
At the same time, one should not overestimate these fairness
variables. It is plausible that most of what the public considers to be
fair is actually what it considers to be most efficient from a utilitarian,
not a deontological perspective. 5 ' Punitive liability, typically justified
150. As a review, the way in which to make the malpractice tort system efficient is to
set EC = SC, or the health care provider's expected costs equal to social costs associated
with its actions, which means that the potential tortfeasor is responsible for all of the costs
it would impose on society for being negligent or abusive. When few tortfeasors are
caught, the punishment for wrongdoing may need to be greater than the actual harm
caused in that particular case in order to deter fully, as in the criminal law system.
Equation (17), the definition of that multiple, simply defines when this occurs. This
Comment does not recommend that liability in the average malpractice case be greater
than compensatory liability. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (defining the
standard of care issues beyond money damages should be considered).
151. This type of analysis is the bread and butter of economics: seeking the efficient
result and then attempting to change the public's attitude based on appeals to the desire
for efficiency. However, this approach may do violence to the often entirely valid values
that laypersons may have. Tort law, which includes fundamental concepts of justice and
morality, would be missing a critical piece of the puzzle if it were to ignore such noneconomic notions of value entirely.
152. In other words, the public wants the most efficient result and forms its concepts of
fairness based on its perception of what is most efficient. See Friedman, supra note 62, at
1129-30 (arguing that more of tort law than is commonly believed may be the intuitive
attempt to create efficient incentive structures). Sometimes this perception is accurate,
and sometimes it is based on factual inaccuracy. Id. However, fairness as a value should
be considered to be more than simple financial efficiency. For more on the difference
between utilitarianism and deontological approaches to ethics and policy, see generally
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using fairness arguments, is in part designed to hold the defendant
accountable for the outrage of others.
C.

Defining the Multiplier under North Carolina'sPunitive Damages
Cap

If compensatory damages are greater than $83,333,153 the
punitive damage cap limits m to no more than three times
compensatory liability. If Equation (17) results in m having a value
greater than 3, this indicates that the punitive damages cap has
inefficiently constrained the trial court. By setting m = 3, the point
beyond which the statute ceases to become efficient, this region of
inefficiency may be defined.

pL + (cP + Cg) -5 D + gu
(20)(20) 3q<
3q <
< pLL(~+
+ (cp + Cg ) - D
A few conclusions may be drawn from this expression. When
compensatory liability, (L), is particularly low, or the probability that
the negligence will be discovered is low, there is an increased
likelihood that a multiplier higher than the statutory cap would be
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence. 15 4 Currently, though, the
punitive damages mechanism is precisely the opposite: in order to get
access to higher punitive damages when the cap is triggered, the
155
plaintiff must prove more, not less, compensatory damages.
Second, when activity occurs that seriously offends the
community, this high existence value cost, p, may call for a multiplier
greater than that imposed by the statutory cap. The right side of
Inequality (19) shows how high court costs and a high burden to the

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

(Mary Gregor

trans. 2001) (presenting the classic exposition of an entirely deontological approach to
moral law framed in terms of duties. and rights); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM
(George Sher ed., 2d ed. 2001) (1863) (discussing the British empirical approach to
utilitarian thinking based on a "theory of higher pleasures").

153. Punitive damages may not exceed the greater of $250,000 or three times
compensatory liability.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2001).

Therefore, compensatory

damages greater than $250,000/3 are subject only to the multiplier cap.
154. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (setting up the model so as to
optimize the deterrence of socially inefficient behavior).
155. § 1D-25; see also POSNER, supra note 61, § 6.15 (discussing the relationship of
compensatory and punitive damages and rhetorically asking whether the two might better
be related inversely).
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plaintiff, pL, 156 decrease the relative importance of existence value
cost in how the trial court should assess the appropriate level of
punitive liability, m.
These equations also suggest how the tort law system should
account for its own failures as captured in q, the fraction of
negligence actually held liable. In the above definition for the
punitive multiplier (m), q need only become a factor in a court's
assessment of damages when that multiplier is greater than 1. This
will not be the case at most trials. Although the model calls for
punitive liability to be expanded somewhat to account for this issue,
as well as providing a substantive criticism of the State's punitive
cap,157 it does not suggest that punitive damages should be assessed
every time there is evidence that the negligence may not have been
uncovered. Rather, if there is an overarching reason for conducting
the bifurcated trial on punitive damages, or situations in which there
is a prima facie case for m > 1, the possibility that the negligence was
some sort of hidden or difficult-to-deter brand of malfeasance" 8
should be a valid argument in the punitive damages trial, as Equation
(17) demonstrates. Under the present regime, it is not. Of course, if
it can be demonstrated that q is chronically very low, it may more
properly be a part of the statutory standard of care, both because it
would be a common feature of negligence cases and because punitive
liability is currently capped and may for political reasons not be
adjustable.
This model also suggests that while the pro-business aims of
punitive damage and medical malpractice reform included concern
for the defendants' litigation costs,159 there are no overall efficiency
gains from designing the standard of care to lower these costs. This
conclusion assumes that defendants' litigation costs are essentially the
same as plaintiffs' litigation costs. Lowering defendants' litigation
costs should therefore be tailored to deterring unnecessary litigation,
156. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (defining the cost to the plaintiff
using the common law Hand formula).
157. For a criticism of North Carolina's cap on punitive damages, see Burton Craige,
Editorial, Winners in Reform: Sexual Harassers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 28, 1995, at A9.
158. To be clear, evidence on this point would need to relate specifically to the
probability that the specific act in question could be easily concealed or unlikely to be
uncovered, thus reinforcing the legislature's desire, expressed in section 1D-1 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, that punitive damages be used by the jury for
deterrence purposes. Turning the trial into a general indictment of the defendant for
other acts of negligence not directly related to this evidentiary point could potentially
create Due Process problems with the trial.
159. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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not to lowering the.standard of care. Equation (14) demonstrates
that the two terms cancel each other out in the overall social cost
equation. The reason for this is that whether or not a potential
plaintiff receives compensation for the injury, the injury will impose a
cost on society.
V. THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE CONSIDERED
Having explored some of the economic features of North
Carolina's laws in this field, discussion of how the various economic
actors will react is warranted. How each side acts to maximize its
utility, subject to the legal constraints, uncovers other important
effects of tort reform. Again, a nursing home remains the example,
although the analysis is applicable beyond that particular type of
health care practice.
A.

The PlaintiffsPerspective

The plaintiff in a nursing home medical malpractice case will
generally be a patient, a decedent's estate, or those relatives with
standing to sue. Many types of nursing home malpractice give rise to
valid claims. Recent examples of nursing home problems include
inaccurate doses of medication, t6° poor hygiene, 16116poor nutrition, 62
failure to communicate medical information, 63 failure to monitor a

patient's condition, 164 misrepresentations and fraud concerning
conditions, 65 and failure to diagnose an illness. 66 Injuries may
include ulcer sores on a patient's feet, 67 amputation of limbs, 68
malnourishment,'169 depression, 17 0 and so on.

Several of the conclusions from Section IV are relevant to this
160. See Black v. Dept. of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
161. See Carl Maclntyre v. Transitional Health Servs., No. 2:96CV00424, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13965, at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 1998).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Fairfax Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States Dept. Health & Human Servs.,
300 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2002).
165. See Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 1996).
166. See Estate of Waters v. Jarman, 144 N.C. App. 98, 98-99, 547 S.E.2d 142, 143
(2001).
167. See Cmty. Care of Am. of Ala., Inc. v. Davis, No. CV-2000-1188, 2002 Ala. LEXIS
281, at *1 (Ala. Nov. 27, 2002).
168. See id. at *2.
169. See Mundell v. Beverly Enterprises-Indiana, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 459, 461 (S.D. Ind.
1991).
170. See Barbara J. Burns et al., Mental Health Service Use by the Elderly in Nursing
Homes, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 331, 336 (1993).
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area of malpractice. First, the-likelihood that a plaintiff will sue for
negligence is arguably lower in the case of nursing homes than it is in
other areas of medical malpractice. 7 ' Residents may feel like they
are lost, become depressed or suicidal, or acquire other mental
illnesses that might severely hinder their ability to rationally
understand their legal opportunities or realize the nature of their
neglect."' In this respect, many of the traditional assumptions behind
American tort law, which is designed to provide private incentives in
the form of extensive compensatory damages for plaintiffs to bring
suit, do not hold.173 Indeed, one of the fundamental assumptions of
economics, that participants are rational welfare maximizers, 7 4 begins
to break down in critical ways. The mathematical interpretation of
this real world problem is that the probability of being held liable (q)
may become alarmingly small. At the same time, the punitive
damages cap combined with lack of a provision for admitting
evidence of a low q in a punitive damages hearing'75 means that there
are major shortcomings in the current law, according to this model.
The plaintiff is limited by the size of punitive damages available to
offset this problem and entirely prevented from presenting evidence
on the defendant's low likelihood of liability.
Closely related to the problem of a low q is the size of
compensatory liability itself. The punitive liability cap grows in
proportion to the compensatory liability,'76 so plaintiffs who can
recover substantial compensatory damages have a major advantage
when punitive damages are justifiable. Within the area of medical
malpractice, average jury awards have certainly ballooned to
unprecedented heights.177 However, while there are no recent,
general studies on malpractice verdicts for nursing homes that have
been published widely, it is at least tenable that awards in that context
171. See Press Release, Nat'l Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, Tort
Reform would Deny Nursing Home Residents Basic Legal Protections and Access to the
Courts (July 17, 2002) (saying that nursing homes that have been successfully cited by

state authorities for violations represent only "the tip of the iceberg") (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
172. See infra note 185.
173. See DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS, supra note 32, § 11.
174. See POSNER, supra note 61, § 1.4.
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-35 (2001) (listing factors to be considered in

determining the amount of punitive damages; consideration of barriers to plaintiff's claims
is not contemplated by the statute).

176. Id. § 1D-25.
177. See Leigh Hopper, Insurance Crisis Hits Nursing Homes, HOUSTON CHRON.,

Aug. 11, 2002, at Al (detailing a recent study by Jury Verdict Research showing that
medical malpractice awards tripled from 1994 to 2000 to an average of $3.5 million).
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are less than their medical malpractice verdicts overall,'78 because the
average prospective length of life for the elderly in a nursing home is
generally going to be low. Often, the largest medical malpractice
verdicts come from prenatal care cases, which feature damage awards
that can be extrapolated to the entire expected life span of the
infant,'79 and emergency care cases, in which the average age of the
plaintiff is probably younger than in nursing home cases. 180 In cases
such as bedsores, dehydration, and other mild neglect, the need for
ongoing, expensive medical care resulting from the injury may be
minimal, and demonstrating substantial compensatory liability
difficult. However, the cap also allows for punitive damages up to
$250,000 without regard to its multiple. 8' That figure, combined with
the costs of litigation, cd, may well be high enough for most cases. In
other words, the deterrence potential of $250,000 punitive damage
penalties may be big enough to deter most egregious conduct. This
assumes, however, that the probability of punishment is sufficiently
high to deter egregious conduct in nursing homes. Perhaps the best
argument that the current tort system does not fully deter abuse,
whether because jury awards are too low or because the probability
of punishment is minimal, is the apparent fact that nursing home
18 2
abuse remains a serious problem.
Potential punitive liability of a defendant nursing home enhances
the incentive to pursue claims. While evidence of insurance coverage
is not generally admissible to prove liability, 3 evidence of net worth
is admissible in a punitive damages hearing." Thus, if the nursing
178. But see id. (noting a 2001 jury verdict against a nursing home for $312.8 million in
Texas).
179. See, e.g., Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Ala. 1987) (awarding $2.5 million
in damages); Koehler v. Neighbors, 751 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Il. App. Ct. 2001) (awarding $1.8
million to injured infant in a medical malpractice action).
180. See Robert J. Buchanan et al., Analysis of Nursing Home Residents in Hospice
Care Using Minimum Date Set, 16 PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 465,466 (2002).
181. § 1D-25(b).
182. See Karl Pillemer & David W. Moore, Abuse of Patients in Nursing Homes:
Findings from a Survey of Staff, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 314, 316-17 (1989); Ellen J. Scott,
Punitive Damages in Lawsuits Against Nursing Homes, 23 J. OF LEGAL MED. 115, 115-18

(2002).
183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 411 (2001) (stating that evidence of liability
insurance is not admissible to prove liability, though it may be used for other matters
asserted).
184. Id. § 1D-35(2)(i). The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not ruled on the
question of whether this evidentiary rule allows liability insurance to be considered as part
of a defendant's net worth for the purpose of advocating for punitive damages. See Mazza
v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 631, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984) (holding that
insurance against punitive awards for wanton or gross medical malpractice is not against
public policy in North Carolina).
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home has a high net value, its net worth will be an added litigation
incentive to the plaintiff and her attorney. The critical step is a victim
seeking legal counsel. The dehumanization that victims of abuse
suffer, whether it be domestic violence, prisoner abuse, or nursing
home abuse, acts in some cases as a counterweight to the added
incentive to litigate because that abuse can cripple the victim's
85
motivation to act.1
B.

The Defendant's Perspective

Tort reform creates incentives to increase both the standards of
and the access to medical care in the community. Chiefly, medical
providers will contend that tort reform expands coverage to lowincome patients and increases the types of medical care available in
the market.
Serving low-income patients, often on Medicare or Medicaid, can
make it particularly difficult for the health care provider to turn a

profit and still meet the required standard of care.

86

Patients who

pay less but who expose the nursing home to the same level of

liability may impose a severe financial burden on the institution that
cares for them.'87 Restricting liability, therefore, lowers the incentive

of the nursing home to avoid accepting a low-income patient because
of potential malpractice liability. The statutory standard of care does
not take into account the particular transaction between health care
provider and patient; in other words, low-income patients do not
contract for a lower standard of care in return for a lower premium
on services. 188 Nevertheless, there is a good argument that, because of
185. See Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and NeglectThe Legal Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 100 (1998) (describing the psychological
limitations on the elderly reporting their abuse and the similarities of elder abuse and
battered women's syndrome); Burns et al., supra note 170, at 336 (documenting that
mentally ill patients in nursing homes have insufficient access to mental health resources
and estimating that only 4.5% of mentally ill patients receive mental health care);
Buchanan et al., supra note 180, at 477 (stating that four in ten nursing home admissions
involve patients with "moderately impaired cognitive skills" and one in sixteen have "very
severe impairment").
186. See Jerry Allegood, Hospitalon CriticalList, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 10, 2001, at 1B (describing the serious financial strains that come from providing
medical care to large Medicare and Medicaid patient populations).
187. See id. But see U. S. Gen. Accounting Office, Skilled Nursing Facilities: Medicare
Payments Exceed Costs for Most but Not All Facilities 1-3 (2002) (No. GAO-03-183)
(asserting that Medicare payments provided a median profit margin of 19% for nursing
homes in the year 2000); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Six State
Case Studies Show Claims and Insurance Costs Still Rise Despite Reforms 1, 40 (1986)
(Sup. Docs. No. GA1.13:HRD-87-21)
188. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2001) (making no provision in the statutory
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the substantial asymmetry in understanding about health care
between the highly knowledgeable provider and the usually lay
patient, there should be a statutory standard set under the tort regime
and not a contract for a particular level of service quality. The
downside of this, however, appears in the extreme low end of the
socioeconomic spectrum. One possible solution to this problem
would be to build flexibility into the standard. For example,
Medicare and Medicaid patients would have standing to sue only if
the nursing home failed to meet the standard of care as practiced in
the locality by other providers serving Medicare or Medicaid
patients.189 It is unlikely that this approach will gain much popularity,
given the perceived unfairness of such a system.
Likewise, allowing insurance companies, including the public
Medicare and Medicaid system, to bargain with health care providers
on standards of care would give the tort system more flexibility to
tailor applicable standards to individual patients. This system might,
however, inflate the transaction costs of medical care beyond what
the system could tolerate, given the expense of insurance companies
bargaining individually with providers. On the other hand, a
relationship with a nursing home is generally long-term, as opposed
to a routine doctor's visit. Since the relationship between a nursing
home and its patient is likely to involve substantial amounts of
money, the added negotiation of a particular standard of care would
seem to be less prohibitive. For example, if the nursing home
industry adopted several different tiers of treatment standards, the
paying party would have an opportunity to select the nursing home
standard of care that best fits his or her ability to pay. Because of the
unique nature of nursing homes in the health care industry, this more
contractual approach may be not only more feasible but in fact
necessary in an age of increasingly expensive and complicated
medical care.
In the area of punitive damage liability, the nursing home may
have less of an incentive to guard against malfeasance in the case of
low-income patients, suggesting that punitive damage figures may
actually need to be quite large in such cases. If the probability that
the home will be held accountable for negligence against poor
patients' 90 is lower than average, given the lower likelihood that the
standard of care for the value of the contract between provider and patient).
189. In other words, this mechanism would amend the current statutory standard of
care in North Carolina to bifurcate private health insurance and public health insurance
standards. See id.
190. In Section III of the model, this fraction is represented by the variable q.
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poor patient will seek a lawyer or feel empowered enough to sue her
nursing home, there is a good reason for expanding, not curtailing,
punitive liability when there is egregious conduct.191 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina's pronouncement that insurance against
punitive damages for medical malpractice is not contrary to public
policy19z further insulates nursing homes that have such coverage
from accountability.193 The important place that punitive damages
have in this Comment's economic model suggests that the North
Carolina General Assembly should either limit or bar insurance
coverage for punitive damages in the nursing home industry, given
that punitive damage remedies are directly tied to creating
individually tailored punishment for specific acts.
There is further reason to believe that the fear that the tort
system inefficiently takes good medical care off the market may be
overstated. The price elasticity for most health care is particularly
low.194 In other words, the percent reduction in the quantity of health
care that a consumer demands is substantially less than any given
percentage increase in the price of that care. This means that when
costs of health care rise, consumers will simply pay the increase. This
inelasticity of demand means that the health care provider will be
able to pass on the cost of increases in malpractice premiums without
much decrease in demand, so there will be comparatively few
procedures that will be taken off the market simply because
malpractice premiums increase their cost.195

So, the net effect of

malpractice insurance costs is likely to be mostly increased cost, not
decreased supply.196

191. See supra notes 150-157 (defining the model's punitive multiplier).
192. Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621,631,319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984).
193. Professor Priest makes a compelling case that the Mazza rule is bad public policy.
See Priest, supra note 33, at 1032-35 (1989) (arguing that punitive damages liability
insurance negates the deterrence purpose of punitive damages).
194. See Ren6 C. J. A. Van Vliet, Effects of Price and Deductibles on Medical Care
Demand, Estimated from Survey Data, 33 APPLIED ECON. 1515, 1523 (2001) (estimating

price elasticities for a variety of health care products and finding most to be under -0.1,
with the overall price elasticity of health care estimated to be -.79).
195. But see Hollis, supra note 57, at B1 (reporting that doctors are curtailing services
because of malpractice costs, though consumer activists criticize the study as politically
motivated to generate support for tort reform); Alan C. Miller, Surgeons in W. Va. Strike
over Cost of Malpractice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003 at Al (reporting on surgeons striking
over the increases in malpractice costs and attempting to influence tort reform relief).
196. M.A. MORRISEY, PRICE SENSITIVITY IN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH CARE POLICY 19 (1992) (estimating the price elasticity of demand for health
care to be between -.17 to -.31).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FUTURE

Economics in Practice
The economic analysis of this Comment is useful to practitioners
in several ways. It can aid in litigation strategy to gauge more
precisely how judges and juries will perceive fairness and policy issues
in their decisions. Economic understanding can also help articulate
why a particular ruling will generate efficiency for the parties in court
as well as society in general-especially, rulings on proposed jury
instructions, the admission of evidence, and summary judgment
motions. On appeal, economic analysis gains even greater currency,
given that the parties more thoroughly brief the issues and policy
Lastly, greater precision in
matters are of special importance.
various,
seemingly independent
how
the
closing arguments about
issues relate economically can help the jury digest all of the issues
presented in the trial and craft a judgment with solid economic
underpinnings. Because the statutes are relatively vague,9 trial court
rulings will heavily impact their application. Economic approaches to
trial practice need not turn the courtroom into an academic seminar.
Rather, the intuitive appeal of efficient results can and often does
guide court rulings." Therefore, stating efficiency arguments in a
palatable manner can bridge the divide between more abstract
analysis and the more practical decisions of judges and juries.
For example, take the relationship of litigation costs to the
A.

efficient standard of care as expressed in Equation ( 1 6 ).2" Imagine

that the plaintiff offers evidence or expert witness testimony on the
standard of care, and the defendant challenges the evidence on the
grounds that it is more prejudicial than probative"' to the local
practice standard of care." 2 The defendant nursing home can argue
197. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1070-71 (1987) (cataloging cases that
considered issues of public policy to be especially important to appellate review).
198. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2001) (giving the court the guidance of a
local practice standard); Id. § 1D-15(a)(3) (allowing the court to consider punitive
remedies for "willful or wanton conduct").
199. See Friedman, supra note 62, at 1130.
200. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
201. See § 8C-1, Rule 403.
202. Id. § 90-21.12; see also id. § 90-285.1 (requiring that nursing home administrators
must abide by rules promulgated by the State Board of Examiners for Nursing Home
Administrators); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, 371.0100 (June 2002) (establishing procedures
of the State Board of Examiners to ensure compliance with professional standards by
administrators).
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that the fact that there is evidence in dispute shows that litigation
costs for a particular procedure are lower in the health care
environment from which the evidence comes. Therefore, in guiding
the court to determine the scope of "local,"20 3 a deviation in litigation
costs between the defendant's place of work and the place from which
the evidence or expert comes would help distinguish between the two
environments. This definition makes intuitive sense because it is
supported by theoretical economics. One would naturally think that
a physician who works in an area of high litigation costs, 4 which are
the single biggest contributor to medical malpractice insurance

premiums,... should not be expected to provide the same level of care
as providers without that cost. The litigation environment continues
to be a major explanation for how medical malpractice costs influence
medical trends across the country.' 6
Therefore, considering
differences in malpractice costs to be integral to a definition of
locality is a logical outgrowth of that economic phenomenon.
The plaintiff can use economic analysis to articulate why punitive
damages are necessary. In arguments to the jury, one way to
articulate why the jury should award punitive damages because of the
"reprehensibility of the defendant's motives and conduct"2 7 is to note
the impact that nursing home abuse has on the community's sense of
value and the shock and pain that friends and family feel as a result.
By framing reprehensibility in those terms, the term acquires a more
concrete meaning-the reason why punitive damages are to be
awarded is to deter defendants from acting in a way that inflicts a

dehumanizing kind of pain on friends, family, and the community.
While North Carolina tort law lacks provisions that would allow the

plaintiff to share punitive damages with a public fund,"8 such that the
203. §90-21.12.
204. See Daniel Eisenberg & Maggie Sieger, The Doctor Won't See You Now, TIME,
June 9, 2003, at 46, 55, 58-59 (reporting on the recent substantial divergences in
malpractice costs across areas of the country).
205. See Vandecruze supra note 10, at 15.
206. Id.; see Eisenberg & Sieger, supra note 204.
207. § 1D-35(2)(a).
208. Several states have established provisions for public sharing of punitive damages
awards. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1425 n.201 (1993) (cataloging some of the states'
experiences with public sharing of punitive damage awards); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
768.73 (1995); GA. STAT. ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2002). The recommendations of this
Comment lead naturally in that direction. If punitive damages are related to an injury to
the community, then damage awards should be paid to the community. The intuitive
appeal of economic reasoning may explain why public sharing of damages has become
popular. See Friedman, supra note 62, at 1130-31 (noting the tendency of popular ethical
judgments to mirror the conclusions of economic analysis).
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public might receive the compensation from the damage award, the
plaintiff can at least make the claim that the injured party should
receive the compensation for public injury, as opposed to allowing the
injury to remain uncompensated. Enunciating the ideas behind a
term as difficult-to-define as "reprehensibility" in a more tangible
manner 209 can establish a more constructive relationship between the
plaintiff's claim and the jury's job of picking a damage award.10
Likewise, parties can offer jury instructions"' to reflect the idea
that the jury stands as a proxy for the community in evaluating the
loss to the community resulting from abusive conduct. The defendant
might use this tactic to counter a plaintiff's efforts to recover an
inflated punitive damages award by taking advantage of the jury's
difficulty with understanding the scope of the specific injury that the
"reprehensibility" prong captures."' Current pattern jury instructions
in North Carolina213 largely restate the punitive damages statute21
without much explanation of how to apply it. For example, the
pattern instruction charges the jury to consider "the reprehensibility
of the defendant's motives and conduct,, 21'5 but does not follow with
more instructions on how to evaluate or measure reprehensibility.
The instructions also provide some minimal guidance towards the end
of the punitive damages discussion, but hardly enough to help a jury
digest with any real consistency216 the sometimes astronomical punitive
damages requests by plaintiffs:
Finally, if you determine, in your discretion, to award punitive
damages, then you may award to the plaintiff an amount which
bears a rational relationship to the sum reasonably needed to
209. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 62, at 961-62 (suggesting jury instructions to
articulate some economic principles underlying punitive damages, though not offering a
definition for "reprehensibility"); see also State Farm v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520
(2003) (emphasizing the importance of accurate jury instructions to the jury's
deliberations on punitive damages).
210. See generally Reid Hastie, Overview: What We Did and What We Found, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 17, 17-26 (2002) (reporting on a series of
experiments designed to discover the processes by which juries pick punitive damages
levels).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1, Rule 51(b).
212. See Kahneman et al., supra note 107, at 31-61 (reporting on experimental
economics investigations of how punitive awards can inflate during jury deliberations).
213. N.C. PATFERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 810.98 (1996).
214. § 1D-35.
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
216. See Reid Hastie et al., Do Plaintiffs' Requests and Plaintiffs' Identities Matter?, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 62, 62 (2002) (reporting that test juries in an
experimental setting were greatly influenced by plaintiffs that asked for high punitive
damage awards).
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punish the defendant for egregiouslywrongful acts and to deter
the defendant and others from committing similar wrongful
acts.217

Federal pattern jury instructions do not provide any more
substantive guidance to the jury on arriving at a damage figure.218
Attorneys who wish to protect their clients' interests by ensuring that
the jury has adequate guidance in an area such as punitive damages 9
have a unique opportunity to do so in a jury instructions conference.220
Closely related to the issue of defining "reprehensibility" is the
problem of how much punitive liability will "deter,1 21 future egregious
conduct. Because this Comment contends that a defendant who faces
a low probability of being held liable should face higher punitive
liability to act as a counterweight, a plaintiff seeking punitive

damages can argue for jury instructions and craft closing arguments
that take into account the possibility that defendants will be able to

escape liability as a routine matter.222 While there is no specific
provision allowing evidence to be admitted on the grounds that it
shows the likelihood or unlikelihood of the defendant being caught,223
evidence that tends to show the frequency of the defendant's past
conduct 22' and concealment of that conduct225 is admissible. That type
of evidence would support an argument that this activity has gone
unpunished in the past, and thus a higher level of deterrence is

needed.

217. Id.
218. See MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 77-5 (2002) ("The purposes
of punitive damages are to punish a defendant for shocking conduct and to set an example
in order to deter a defendant and others from committing similar acts in the future."). See
generally George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to Understand It?, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 1, 11 (2002) (discussing the typical trial procedures for
punitive damages instructions).
219. See Priest, supra note 218 at 1-3.
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 51 (2001); NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF COURT,
Rule 21 (2002). See generally Kenneth S. Broun, North Carolina Jury Instruction
Practice-Is It Time to Get the Judge off the Tightrope?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 719 (1974)
(discussing the features of North Carolina jury instruction practice of the time); Walter W.
Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1988) (arguing for the need to provide more lucid and
explanatory jury instructions for juries, and for reform of pattern jury instructions).
221. § 1D-1; see also N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 809.00-809.90 (1996)
(including deterrence in the pattern jury instruction on punitive damages).
222. See § 1D-1 ("Punitive damages may be awarded ...to deter a defendant and
others from committing similar wrongful acts").
223. See § 1D-35(2).
224. § 1D-35(2)(g).
225. § 1D-35(2)(f).

20031

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

2413

Again, one need not employ mathematical economics to make
the common-sense point that, like criminal law punishment
mechanisms, the need to raise the level of punishment rises when the
defendant can easily escape accountability. As this Comment has
previously argued, this probability is especially relevant in the area of
nursing home malpractice. 226 Moreover, the "local practice"
standard, 27 if it creates a situation where egregious acts are less likely
to be uncovered, might be less of a deterrent than the Hand rule's
reasonableness standard.2 The explanation for this scenario, as with
the other examples in this Section, makes intuitive sense: if the
nursing home does follow the standard practice guidelines,22 it should
be free from having to pay for injuries that occur during medical care
that comports to industry standard. However, if the tortfeasor takes
advantage of a particular standard procedure to conceal willful or
wanton acts,230 the jury should use the punitive damages remedy to
counteract the defendant's taking advantage of the professional
courtesy that the medical malpractice standard of care allows.
Case note: State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell
The recent case State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
231 is the latest in a line of U.S. Supreme Court opinions
Campbell,
which attempt to craft a workable Due Process framework for
evaluating punitive damages awards.232 State Farm has special
relevance for the issues that this Comment presents because the
more precisely how the jury should define
opinion tackled 233
"reprehensibility," ' how courts should evaluate the punitive
multiplier in Due Process analysis,2 and the role of jury instructions
in ensuring fair play at trial.2 5

B.

226. See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
227. § 90-21.12.
228. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
229. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 483 (2003) (establishing the national requirements for
long-term care facilities).
230. § 1D-15.
231. 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
232. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001) (establishing de novo review for punitive damages Due Process issues); BMW v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (holding that grossly excessive punitive damage awards
violate due process); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (emphasizing
the "quasi-criminal" nature of punitive penalties and holding that Alabama's common law
punitive damages regime violates due process).
233. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
234. Id. at 1524-25.
235. Id. at 1520.
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For the purposes of the present discussion, economic analysis can
be used to define more precisely how an advocate's position comports
with the requirements of State Farm. The Court's definition of
reprehensibility appears to include both moral considerations and
patterns of egregious activity,23" though the moral factors predominate
in the definition. 237 The guideline can be useful in two principal
ways-supporting an argument for a particular jury instruction and
supporting arguments in the appellate process. State Farm reaffirms
the requirement that punitive damage awards not be "grossly
excessive or arbitrary., 238 Thus, appellate challenges to a punitive
award will revolve around an award's excessiveness or arbitrariness.
The tension between the two standards is palpable; on the one hand,
reprehensibility is an incredibly affective and imprecise term. At the
same time, the Supreme Court draws an increasingly hard line against
awards that do not have a solid, rational basis.239
Economic reasoning has the potential to mediate between the
two poles. The plaintiff, for example, can anchor its defense of a jury
award on the impact that the reprehensible action had on the larger
community's desire for fairness through an existence value rationale.
Thus, the plaintiff can draw a link between rational social welfare
costs and the jury's assessment of "reprehensibility." The criteria for

reprehensibility in State Farm""provides a Supreme Court-approved
framework for further evaluating how egregious activity impacts basic
notions of fairness as embodied in the Due Process Clause. 24 ' The
236. Id. at 1521. The Court reviewed the permissible criteria for assessing punitive
damages as follows:
"[the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." We have
instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety
of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. (quoting BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
237. See id. While mentioning that repeated acts add to reprehensibility, which
suggests that the defendant has been able to escape liability frequently, the definition
focuses on criteria that tend to have a direct emotional impact, such as physical harm, the
mental state of the tortfeasor, and the disregard for other members of the community's
health or safety. Id.
238. Id. at 1519-20.
239. See id. at 1526 (holding that the trial court award was "irrational and arbitrary"
and therefore unconstitutional).
240. Id. at 1521.
241. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("This
constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic
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Supreme Court, as a legal authority, establishes basic notions of
fairness in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.242
Justice Kennedy's opinion also emphasizes that it is important to
have precise jury instructions to ensure due process.2 3 Connecting
the importance of jury instructions to a rational process guided by
more precise formulas, the opinion makes it clear that a well-defined
framework for adjudging punitive liability is not just an academic
question appropriate for appeal, it also is a necessary component of
jury deliberations.244 While due process discussions tend to be framed
in terms of justice and fairness, many of the concepts that they
embody have economic underpinnings 6 that largely delineate the
outer bounds of economically justifiable law. Given that the punitive
damages remedy is a fact-specific legal action as opposed to
legislative law that is broadly applicable to a class,247 effective defense
of a client's due process rights intersects with the client's, and
society's, economic interests in the codification of jury instructions for
the trial.248
State Farm is perhaps most path-breaking in its opinion on
punitive multipliers. 9
The Court cautions that "[f]ew awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process., 25" For
awards greater than $250,000, North Carolina's punitive damages cap
on three times compensatory damages25 ' would fall comfortably
within this Due Process guideline. For awards under the $250,000
threshold, where there is no statutory limit on the multiplier,252
unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property.").
242. See William Van Alstyne, Notes on the Constitution: Part II, Antinomial Choices
and the Role of the Supreme Court, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1987) ("The Supreme
Court ... has the main role ultimately in attempting to see that the government observes
basic justice.").
243. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
244. Id. (citations omitted).
245. See Van Alstyne, supra note 242, at 1283.
246. See Friedman, supra note 62, at 1130.
247. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-87 (1992) (describing the strengths and
weaknesses of rule-making law versus adjudicatory law and noting the short-comings of
the rule-making process in the administrative law context).
248. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
249. See id. at 1524.
250. Id.
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2001); See also FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73 (2002)
(capping punitive damages in Florida at three times the amount of compensatory
damages).
252. § 1D-25(b).
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economic reasoning would become critical to assessing whether the
jury award satisfies State Farm.
Economic arguments can be used to support either side. The
defendant's appellate argument will tend to focus on the idea that the
punitive award resulted more from spite than a careful economic
analysis of what added deterrent would be needed to achieve an
efficient result,"3 and so was "irrational and arbitrary"25' in violation
of the Due Process Clause. When the defendant's net worth is high,
there is a substantial risk that the jury will focus on a desire to shock
the defendant in a way that is out of proportion to the appropriate,
optimal level of punitive damages. 5' The plaintiff's appellate
argument will tend to focus on the externalities that the tort creates in
terms of its negative impact on the community as well as, in some
cases, the need for a high punitive multiple when actual
compensatory damages are low, which can be the case in elderly care
cases.56 State Farm recognizes the latter situation.
[B]ecause there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive
damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those
previously upheld may comport with due process where a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages. However, the converse is also true. When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee. The precise
award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff.257
Thus, while State Farm and its predecessor cases on due process
limitations of punitive damages259 are primarily framed in terms of
fairness and justice, many of the concepts from these cases are
susceptible to economic arguments that are easily grasped by judges
and juries.259 At both the trial and the appellate level, a unified
approach to weighing values and efficiencies greatly enhances the
prospect that the law will, in practice as well as theory, foster social
253. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520 ("punitive damages serve a broader function;
they are aimed at deterrence and retribution").
254. See id. at 1526.
255. Id. at 1520.
256. See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
257. See State Farm, 123 S.Ct. at 1524 (citations omitted).
258. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
259. See generally POSNER, supra note 61, § 2.2.
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welfare.
CONCLUSION

Whatever the future of the nursing home industry, it seems clear
that these dilemmas are likely to remain at the forefront of the
industry's policy concerns. The population of senior citizens in the
United States, particularly in North Carolina, given its high quality of
medical care and favorable climate, will rise dramatically in the
coming decades. 21 Tort law, especially medical malpractice, will have
to grow and develop with these difficult new policy problems. The
high financial and human stakes require careful economic
consideration of these issues.
This Comment presents the hypothesis that punitive damage
liability needs to be considered in concert with medical malpractice
statutes in order to achieve an efficient system of private incentives.
Jury instructions need to reflect more precisely the economic
rationales of standards of care and damage assessment. Evidence law
should be modified to allow for a more accurate presentation of the
economic issues involved. Moreover, the judicial rule in North
Carolina that insurance against punitive liability in medical
malpractice is in line with public policy 261 deserves legislative
reconsideration.
Just as importantly, this study attempts to articulate how the area
of law and economics needs to adapt to grasp more fully the subtle
issues involved in solving problems laden with complex value systems.
Here, the values of many citizens for fostering a society free of
medical malpractice as well as a society free from constant litigation
have a place in economic understanding. Likewise, in order to model
more fully a real world statutory framework, an inclusive,
comprehensive approach to analysis is more likely to produce
accurate results. Instead of assuming constant variables while
examining a particular economic phenomenon, these variables need
to become integrated into the model in order to present a true and
accurate picture of a real problem. While this Comment's model by
no means achieves this ideal, it attempts to synthesize several
different economic theories in coming to grips with North Carolina's
laws. It is thus an inductive approach at least in part; by
understanding the specifics of a particular legal framework in some
260. See Ned Glascock, The Changing Face of the New Century, NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 1, 2000, at 2A.
261. Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621,631,319 S.E.2d 217,223 (1984).
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detail, it may perhaps help explain other, similar legal frameworks in
other states. This method differs somewhat from most economic
analyses of punitive damages, as well as law and economics
approaches in general, which often approach legal issues abstractly
through a process more akin to deduction and without much focus on
any particular statutory framework.
Finally, tort reform, having undergone a few rounds in recent
decades at the state level,262 may yet see a new, high stakes round at
the federal level. 263 There are proposals to enact national caps on
damages for business and health care providers, and with the
Republican take-over of the Senate, led by physician and Senate
Majority Leader William Frist, the issue has gained momentum.2 6
The prospect of federal laws on the matter raises questions of
federalism, the advantages and disadvantages of acting at the national
versus state level in the area of tort law, and the need for federal and
state laws to harmonize so as to provide efficient tort regimes.
Designing these laws in a comprehensive and integrated fashion is
critical to an efficient and humane system of tort law.
ROBERT WARD SHAW

262. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 32, § 384.
263. See William E. Gibson, GOP Keeps Goals Modest, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 5,

2003, at Al; Press Release, National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, Tort
Reform Would Deny Nursing Home Residents Basic Legal Protections and Access to the
Courts (July 17, 2002) (criticizing proposed federal tort reform legislation as hurting
nursing home patients) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
264. See Gibson, supranote 263, at Al.

